


From cold war to stagflation, are we



Etienne de Callataÿ,
Chief Economist, Orcadia AM

Threats



RISEING
INTEREST
RATES



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Content



1. Environment



2. A broader perspective



3. ST outlook



4. Financial conditions


1. Environment

(1) Pandemics – getting used to it

- Still with us
- Especially in China
- With impact on
 - * supply
 - * sentiment
- But clearly receding



PMI, China



(2) Russia – nobody knows

- No economic rationale => impossible to predict
- Bad news
 - * More uncertainty for longer
 - * Risk of face-saving behavior
- Good news
 - * Unity within the EU, with changing roles
 - Germany under economic pressure
 - Tension between Germany and Eastern EU countries
 - EU integration (additional EU debt issuance)
 - * Weakness of Russian army
 - * Deterrence Taiwan




(3) Inflation – everybody knows

Is there a chart really needed?

(4) Interest rates

Look at the US first – 10 Y sovereign rate, US vs. Germany



Source : Boursorama

<https://www.boursorama.com/bourse/taux/>

Chart 8

(5) Social cohesion

- *It is worth remembering that the chant going into Tahrir Square in the Arab Spring was “Bread, Freedom, Dignity.”*
(Jeremy Grantham, GMO, April 2022)
- *Public-opinion polls have shown that inflation (or something like inflation) has often been viewed as the most important national problem.*
(Robert Shiller (1997), quoted by Agarwal & Kimball, How Costly Is Inflation ?, IMF, March 20)

2. A broader perspective

Crises are the normality !


- 2008 – 2009 Great Financial crisis
- 2010 – 2012+ EU Sovereign debt crisis
- 2020 – 2022 Sanitary crisis
- 2022 – ... Geopolitical crisis
- 2022 – ... Inflation crisis

Main lessons :

- “so far so good”
- procrastination

Commodity prices : something big

: All Commodity Price Index, 2016 = 100, includes both Fuel and Non-Fuel Price Indices




Source : IMF, IMF Data, Primary Commodity Price System
<https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sid=1547558078595>

Source: Primary Commodity Price System (PCPS) (05/12/2022)
 Retrieved: 6/7/2022 4:19 AM from <https://data.imf.org> 443

Commodity prices : something new?

EXHIBIT 2: GMO COMMODITY INDEX




As of 3/31/2022 | Source: Global Financial Data, GMO

Why a reversal? (1/3)

For commodities : partly explained by environmental transition

- New needs (transport, heating, ...)
- Regulation
- Polluter pays tax principle
- Fear of **stranded assets** => lowering of supply
- Lower yields (impact of climate and of less polluting inputs on yields)
- Social concerns (labor conditions)
- Growing demand from emerging countries
- ...



Source: Wood Mackenzie

Source : The Economist, March 28, 2022

Why a reversal? (2/3)


Inflation at large:

- Emerging markets no longer emerging / higher wages
- Re-shoring / friendly shoring / end of globalization
- Demographics + Great resignation = Labor shortage
- Mismatch supply vs. demand
 - on the labor market
 - on the goods and services market
- Higher taxes

Why a reversal? (3/3)

Be careful!

- This time is different? Unlikely, as times are rarely that different !!!
 - Higher prices => Higher supply
 - + Substitution
 - + Innovation
- => self-correcting process



Stagflation is back?

Mind the difference

- Lower growth + higher inflation
- Back to the 70s ?
 - * inflation then
 - * inflation anchoring then
 - * growth then
 - * unemployment then
 - * oil/GDP then
 - * wage indexation then

YES

NO

much higher

absent

much lower


much higher and rising

much higher

much more frequent

More fossil-free

The world gets much more mileage per barrel of oil than in the 1970s, helping to insulate the global economy from price shocks.



Source: St. Louis Fed; BLS; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Oil intensity is defined as barrels of oil needed to produce \$1 million in real GDP.
Real GDP is based on constant 2017 purchasing-power-parity international dollars.
Right panel – spot crude oil price: West Texas Intermediate (WTI)/consumer price index for all urban consumers: all items in U.S. city average.

IMF

USSR is back?



The Cuban Missile Crisis
Cartoon published in the United States, 1962



Chart 18


Beware strength ... beware weakness

National GDP, 1952 to 2017

Adjusted for inflation and price differences between countries (measured in 2011 international-\$).



LINEAR LOG + Add country




Source: Feenstra et al. (2019) Penn World Table 9.1

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Moving backwards

Russia, demographic and economic measures, 2012=100



Sources: World Bank; Rosstat; IMF; Institute of International Finance; World Happiness Report 2021; "Global and national declines in life expectancy: an end-of-2021 assessment", by Patrick Hueveline, 2021

*At birth
†As measured in the World Happiness Report

Beware warnings (1/2)

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html

Henry Kissinger: To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end

By **Henry A. Kissinger**
March 5, 2014

THE 7 FROM *The Washington Post*

Beware warnings (2/2)

“Does Europe simply say that if Russia is the cheapest provider of gas, then we should buy from Russia regardless of the implications for its security...?”

(Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, 2006)

Inflation, my friend

Cons

- Losers and winners, with adverse social impact
- Uncertainty => less activity / higher risk premium

Pros

- Good for indebted authorities ... and therefore for macroeconomic & financial stability
- Penalty on cautious savings => higher consumption and/or more risk-taking
- Creative destruction; reallocation of resources (labor & demand for goods) ; higher productivity
- Away from the « zero lower bound » limit / good for monetary policy
- Push for anti-trust policies

3. Short-term outlook

Six months ago

Capex

- Technology
- Climate transition
- ESG
- Low interest rates



Consumption

- Sustained income
- High savings
- No fear of unemployment

Budgetary policy

- Low interest rates

Monetary policy

Six months later

Capex

- Technology
- Climate transition
- ESG
- Low interest rates



Consumption

- Sustained income ... **but inflation**
- High savings
- No fear of unemployment ... **but war**

Budgetary policy

- Low interest rates
... **but rising**

Monetary policy
???

Ukraine, an overview of economic impact

The war in Ukraine is likely to worsen Europe's economic problems

Short- and long-term implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union

	Short-term effects (1-2 years)	Long-term effects (3-5 years)
Trade and foreign direct investment	Collapse of exports to Russia. Reduced capital for EU firms.	Restructuring of supply chains and foreign direct investment flows away from Russia.
Refugees and reconstruction	Large inflows of refugees to EU states lead to additional fiscal costs.	No lasting effect. Most refugees are likely to return to Ukraine or enter the EU workforce. Contribution to the rebuilding of Ukraine.
Defense	Added costs of weapons and military support for Ukraine weigh on defense budgets.	Increases to EU defense budgets.
Efficiency	No short-term effect.	EU firms to reconsider their reliance on extended supply chains and just-in-time delivery schemes, causing further deglobalization and reduced efficiency.
Food	Higher food prices as Ukrainian and Russian crop yields fall, reducing global supply and damaging fragile developing economies.	No lasting effect.
Energy	Higher energy bills. Reduced efficiency from temporary reliance on outdated energy sources. Possible supply disruptions. Added costs from alternative sourcing.	New energy sourcing. More energy integration at the EU level. Accelerated transition to renewables.
Uncertainty	More precautionary saving.	Possible drive towards closer EU policy integration.


Source : Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry, The war in Ukraine is likely to worsen Europe's economic problems, PIIE, May 9, 2022

Identified risks

- Bottlenecks
- Loss of purchasing power from wages and from savings
- Loss of confidence
- Bankruptcies
- Monetary tightening
- Loss of budgetary room for maneuver
(less growth military spending + refugees + reconstruction + higher interest rates)

Scenario – OECD

Impact simulé sur la croissance économique et l'inflation




Note : Impact simulé sur le PIB (variation en %) et sur l'inflation (points de %) sur douze mois à partir du 24 février 2022. • Source : Perspectives économiques de l'OCDE, Rapport intermédiaire, mars 2022.

Scenario – IMF (1/2)

The weight of war

Europe's advanced and emerging economies will recover more slowly because of spillovers from the war in Ukraine.

(Real GDP Index, 2019 = 100)



Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Advanced Europe and Emerging Europe are PPP GDP weighted average.
Emerging Europe excludes Belarus, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.


IMF

Scenario – IMF (2/2)

Shaken by war

Global growth has been revised down for 2022 and 2023 due largely to the impact of the war in Ukraine.

Total annual revision
(percentage points;
relative to Jan 2022 WEO)



2022 Real GDP growth
(percent; year over year)



Sources: IMF, *World Economic Outlook*; and IMF staff calculations.

IMF

(real GDP, annual percent change)	PROJECTIONS		
	2021	2022	2023
World Output	6.1	3.6	3.6
Advanced Economies	5.2	3.3	2.4
United States	5.7	3.7	2.3
Euro Area	5.3	2.8	2.3
Germany	2.8	2.1	2.7
France	7.0	2.9	1.4
Italy	6.6	2.3	1.7
Spain	5.1	4.8	3.3
Japan	1.6	2.4	2.3
United Kingdom	7.4	3.7	1.2
Canada	4.6	3.9	2.8
Other Advanced Economies	5.0	3.1	3.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies	6.8	3.8	4.4
Emerging and Developing Asia	7.3	5.4	5.6
China	8.1	4.4	5.1

Dilemma

Support needed : war
financing, popular
discontent, environmental
transition



Inflation has to be fought against
(adverse impact on social cohesion,
on States, and on financial stability)

Loss of purchasing power, a reality

Real wage and earnings growth, March 2022–2022Q1			
	1-year percent change	Percent difference from pre-pandemic level	Percent difference from pre-pandemic trend
ECI, all civilian workers	-3.6	-2.6	-5.0
Average hourly earnings, total private	-2.7	0.1	-2.9
Nonfarm business sector, hourly compensation	-1.4	4.6	0.7
Median usual weekly earnings	-3.0	-0.1	-3.7


Note: ECI is Employment Cost Index for wages and salaries. Pre-pandemic level is December 2019 for ECI, February 2020 for average hourly earnings, and 2019Q4 for hourly compensation and median usual weekly earnings. Pre-pandemic trend based on log-linear time trend for 2018 and 2019. Nominal wage measures deflated by Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U).
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics via Macrobond; authors' calculations.

Some comfort – no wage/price vicious circle

Figure 2

Wage growth remains high, but has likely already peaked

Percent change in average hourly earnings for all private industries, annual rate



Source : Karen Dynan and Wilson Powell III,
Strong US jobs report for May should not change
Fed plans, PIIE, June 3, 2022



Note: Adjusted for changing composition of employment using chain-weighted aggregation (by total hours worked) of average hourly earnings by industry.

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics via Macrobond and authors' calculations

Some comfort – support from China

- China knows where national interest are
 - * Russia, a minor client
 - * China, a net importer of energy
- China is facing other challenges
 - * internal stability, top priority
 - * real estate indebtedness
- Means available to boost the activity



Some comfort – boycott : costly but bearable


What if? The economic effects for Germany of a stop of energy imports from Russia

Rüdiger Bachmann, David Baqae, Christian Bayer, Moritz Kuhn, Andreas Löschel, Benjamin Moll, Andreas Peichl, Karen Pittel, Moritz Schularick*



7 March 2022

This article discusses the economic effects of a potential cut-off of the German economy from Russian energy imports. We show that the effects are likely to be substantial but manageable. In the short run, a stop of Russian energy imports would lead to a GDP decline in range between 0.5% and 3% (cf. the GDP decline in 2020 during the pandemic was 4.5%).

Some comfort – bottlenecks will go away



Some comfort – confidence will be back




Some comfort – yesterday’s supports are still largely at play

- Savings ratio
- Labor market
- Technology
- Environmental transition

4. Financial conditions

THE feature : not politics, but LT rates, and especially the real ones



Source : Pictet, le 13/5/2022


[Pandemics + Ukraine + ↑inflation + ↑interest rates] = ???

- On corporate earnings
 - * impact on economic activity, globally
 - * specific impact on some sectors / countries / regions
 - * impact on margins
 - * impact on taxation & other policies

- On discounting
 - * on risk-free rate
 - * on risk premium


Corporate earnings – surprise #1 : revised upwards

Stoxx Europe 600 – net margin sales and EPS revisions for 2022



Corporate earnings – surprise #2 : ... and more so in Europe than in the US

STOXX Europe 600 vs S&P 500 2022 EPS revisions



Corporate earnings : at risk ... but

- Inflation ? Not a risk as long as limited inflation
- Higher wages ? A cost factor ... and a demand factor as well
- International taxes ? Good for the « level playing field » and social cohesion
- Environmental regulations ? Cost of non-action is much bigger
- Chinese slowdown ? *Chi va piano va sano*


Higher interest rates ? Yes ... but

- Inflation has peaked (base effect + no wage / price spiral)
- Necessity knows no law
 - States : heavily indebted, while facing ageing + social discontent
 - + need to finance the environmental transition (regulations & taxes are way too unpopular)
 - + financial stability requirement (within the Euro Area; financial sector as creditor)
- Interest rate expectations remain well anchored
- Higher rates not efficient to fight against supply-driven inflation

No “Volcker moment” this time

- No need
(anchoring of expectations, no wage spiral, ...)
- No possibility
in 1983, US economy salvaged by fiscal expansion ...
today, public indebtedness is much higher

Exhibit 4 – Fiscal policy “picked up the pieces” 3 years later



No paranoid attitude : the Central Bank is my friend !

How the S&P 500 performs in Fed rate-hike cycles



Source: Truist Advisory Services

Warning

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Past performance is not indicative of future results.
The primary risk of investing is a loss of capital that may be permanent and that may be complete.

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